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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARNES BANKING COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of Fi-
nancial Institutions of the State of 
Utah; ELROY NELSON, THOMAS 
F. HAWKES and LINN C. BAKER 
and FIRST SECURITY CORPORA-
TION, a bank holding company, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
13946 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
ELROY NELSON, THOMAS F. HAWKES and LINN 
C. BAKER and FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, 
a bank holding company 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action asking the trial court 
to review the administrative order of the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions granting the application of cer-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tain defendants to organize a unit bank in Kaysville, 
Utah and to enjoin the establishment of said bank. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that the findings, order and pro-
cedures of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
were proper and sustained the agency's findings. The 
trial court found that there were no material issues of 
fact before the court, and it therefore granted a summary 
judgment to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court vacating the 
trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 23, 1973, Elroy Nelson, Thomas F. 
Hawkes and Linn C. Baker, as officers of First Security 
Corporation, a bank holding company, or its affiliates, 
filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions an 
application for permission to organize a unit bank in the 
city of Kaysville, Utah. The Commissioner, after the 
appropriate notice to all concerned, called a public hear-
ing on June 20, 1973, to consider the application. At the 
hearing Barnes Banking Company fully presented its 
opposition to the application. 
On August 22, 1973, W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah, (herein-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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after referred to as the Bank Commissioner (§ 7-1-1.2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953) entered his findings of 
fact, conclusions and order conditionally granting the 
application of defendants to organize the proposed First 
Security State Bank of Kaysville in the City of Kays-
ville.1 
The appellant has the only bank in the rapidly grow-
ing suburban Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. After the 
respondents' application to establish a state unit bank 
in that area was granted, appellant by this court action 
attempted to block the implementation of the Commis-
sioner's decision. By this means appellant seeks to main-
tain its monopoly in the banking services offered in the 
relevant market area by attempting to prevent the en-
try of any competitive alternative. 
First Security Corporation has no branch, unit bank 
or affiliate in the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. In an 
area larger than the relevant market, Davis County, 
First Security has only a small service office at Hill Field, 
one branch in the northern part of the county, and a unit 
bank in Bountiful. 
1
 "The application of Elroy Nelson, Thomas F. Hawkes and Linn 
C. Baker for permission to organize a unit bank in Kaysville, Davis 
County, Utah, to be known as First Security Bank of Kaysville, 
is hereby granted subject to the conditions that it obtain approval 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for insurance of 
its accounts and that First Security Corporation obtain approval 
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for 
acquisition of subsantially all of the shares of the new bank." See 
Exhibit A accompanying defendants' brief in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO 
ANY MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
The agency is the finder of fact. The only questions 
before the trial court were questions of law. 
Professor Moore, in his treatise on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, discussed the applicability of Federal 
Rule 56 to the review of an administrative order: 
Thus in an action to . . . obtain review of an ad-
ministrative order where the plaintiff has no right 
to a trial de novo, but is limited to a review of 
the record before the agency and this record is 
before the court, the case is ripe for summary 
disposition, for whether the order is supported 
by sufficient evidence, under the applicable stat-
utory standard, or is otherwise legally assailable 
involves matters of law. 6 J. Moore, Federal 
Practice, 2d Ed. (1974), Para. 56.17[3] at 2472. 
See Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F. 2d 456 (9th 
Cir. 1964). 
This discussion, although referring to the federal rule, 
is analogous. It expresses the rationale behind both the 
federal and state Rule 56 and the applicability of the rule 
in a situation involving review of administrative decisions 
on either the federal or state level. Utah Rule 56(c), 
according to the compiler's notes, is similar to Fed-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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eral Rule 56(c). It appears that the federal analogy is 
appropriate. 
This court has enunciated the principle of the court's 
deferring to the factual determination of the administra-
tive agency. In Central Bank N Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 
28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) the court stated at 
page 18: 
In the field of administrative law the assumption 
is indulged that the administrator (or adminis-
trative tribunal) possesses superior knowledge 
and expertise because of specialized training and 
experience, and the focus of interest within the 
particular field. For this reason the well-estab-
lished rule is that the courts indulge him con-
siderable latitude in determinations he makes on 
questions of fact and also in the exercise of his 
discretion with respect to the responsibilities 
which the law imposes upon him; {Camacho v. 
Industrial Comm. of Utah, 119 Utah 181, 225 
P. 2d 728; City of North Las Vegas v. Public 
Service Comm., 83 Nev. 278, 429 P. 2d 66) and 
they will not interfere therewith unless it ap-
pears that he acted in excess of his powers, or 
that he so abused his discretion that his action 
was capricious or arbitrary. (Sec. 7-1-26(4), 
U. C. A. 1953; Zions First National Bank, N.A. 
v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239, 390 P. 2d 854; Uintah 
Freight Lines v. Public Service Comm., 119 Utah 
491, 229 P. 2d 675). 
The trial court properly granted a summary judg-
ment after it found as a matter of law that the rec-
ord of the proceeding before the administrative agency 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contained substantial evidence and that the Bank Com-
missioner's ruling was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law". 
§ 7-1-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE A TRIAL 
DE NOVO OF THE FACTUAL DETERMIN-
ATIONS MADE BY THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCY. 
A. The issue of whether the proposed bank 
would interfere with appellant's business was 
properly decided by the State Agency. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-1-26(4), the 
action of the Bank Commissioner in granting the defen-
dants' application is reviewable in the district court. The 
scope of that review is defined as follows: 
The reviewing court shall have power to hold 
unlawful and set aside any act, decision or rul-
ing of the bank commissioner found to be arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-
wise not in accordance with law. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted this statute in a 
similar fact situation in Central Bank & Trust Company 
v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) at page 
18: 
Our duty is to look upon the whole evidence in 
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the light favorable to the determination made by 
the Bank Commissioner and the trial court, and 
to sustain them if there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence to justify doing so. 
. . . [The courts] will not interfere [with an ad-
ministrator's decision] unless it appears that he 
acted in excess of his powers, or that he so abused 
his discretion that his action was capricious or 
arbitrary. 
Plaintiff-appellant in its brief does not contest the 
legal findings of the trial court that: (1) there is suffi-
cient evidence in the record to sustain the Commission-
er's findings and order; (2) the Commissioner did not 
abuse his discretion; and (3) the decision by the Com-
missioner was not a capricious or arbitrary action. Rather, 
the plaintiff-appellant faults the lower court for not in-
dulging in a trial de novo on the factual issues heard and 
decided by the Commissioner. 
Appellant contends that because there was some 
evidence in the record that could be viewed as suporting 
the plaintiff's contentions^ this court should replace the 
state agency's factual determination with another view 
of the fact. See page 8 of appellants' brief. 
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, does not 
provide a trial de novo for a protestant to the Bank Oom-
Commissioner's decision. The court should not weigh 
the evidence. Rather it simply determines if there is 
enough evidence in the record to support the Commis-
sioner's view of the evidence. In other words, the court 
determines if there is some factual basis in the record 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for the Commissioner's findings. See Central Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, supra. 
The plaintiff fully presented its assertions and any 
evidence it had to the finder of fact. The administrative 
agency with its expertise in the area chose to believe the 
evidence in support of defendants-respondents' position. 
The substantial evidence in support of the Commis-
sioner's ruling that the proposed bank would not inter-
fere with plaintiff's existing banking business is primar-
ily found in the transcript of record of hearing before 
the Commissioner at pages 155-204 and pages 282 to 
289. Within those portions of the transcript reference 
is made to an economic survey found at page 111 to and 
including page 147 of the record herein. 
The substantial evidence presented to the Commis-
sioner clearly reveals that the proposed new bank would 
not materially damage plaintiff's existing bank. The pro-
posed new bank would acquire new accounts held by 
residents of Kaysville - Fruit Heights in other banks 
outside of the Kaysville area. The proposed new bank 
would better serve the growing demand for banking busi-
ness in the Kaysville area and present its residents with 
a choice of banks, but it would not damage plaintiff's 
existing banking business. Historically, new unit banks 
have not damaged the existing banking business in areas 
similarly situated to the Kaysville area. The establish-
ment of new unit banks did not damage new banks in 
the areas of Layton, Bountiful and Springville (Tr. p. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
201). See also Central Bank & Trust Co. v Brimhali9 
28 Utah 2d 14 (1972). 
Additionally, the testimony before the Bank Com-
missioner contains substantial evidence that the Banking 
Commissioner appropriately exercised the broad discre-
tion conferred upon him by statute when he approved 
defendants' application. The record clearly reveals that 
the proposed new bank would not materially damage 
plaintiff's existing business. The record compels the con-
clusion that there is a tremendous need in the Kaysville 
area for the proposed new bank and that showing of need 
makes it hard to envision that the existing bank would 
be damaged. 
The banking needs within the Kaysville area are not 
being satisfied by plaintiff's existing bank (Tr. pp. 166, 
173, 176 and 184). Deposits by Kaysville residents in 
banks outside the Kaysville area and loans to Kaysville 
residents by banks outside the Kaysville area indicate 
that Kaysville residents prefer to transact banking busi-
ness with banks other than plaintiff's bank (Tr. p. 190). 
Some of the numerous deposits and loans by Kaysville 
residents with banks other than plaintiff's existing bank 
will probably be transferred by Kaysville residents to the 
proposed new unit bank for the convenience of the Kays-
ville residents. This transfer of loans and accounts would 
take nothing from plaintiff's existing bank because it 
does not have the business and would not acquire that 
business (Tr. p. 190). 
Furthermore, the new bank would satisfy the credit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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needs of the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 195). Plaintiff's ex-
isting bank cannot and will not furnish the demand for 
mortgage funds for the substantial new housing develop-
ment in the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 196). The new bank 
will help satisfy a growing demand for additional bank-
ing services required by the growth in the number of 
residents in the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 173). The growth 
in population in the Kaysville area has created a greater 
demand for credit (Tr. p. 176) and the new bank will 
probably have a policy for loans that will assist in satis-
fying this demand which plaintiff's existing bank's policy 
prevents it from satisfying (Tr. p. 195). Plaintiff's ex-
isting bank has a ratio of loans to deposits that is far 
below any other bank in the area. The existing bank's 
loan policies prevent that bank from satisfying the bank-
ing needs of the growing Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. 
All of this evidence before the Bank Commissioner over-
whelmingly demonstrates a growing demand for banking 
service in the Kaysville area and the failure of the ex-
isting, plaintiff-appellant's bank to meet that demand. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the Bank Commissioner's conclusion that the defendanits' 
proposed new bank will not interfere with the plainitiff-
appellant's bank. 
B. The Commissioner properly decided the is-
sues under the state statutes within his pri-
mary jurisdiction and he properly condi-
tioned his order upon the findings under the 
federal banking and antitrust statutes by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the federal banking agencies who have pri-
mary jurisdiction over the federal banking 
issues. 
Plaintiff -appellant appears to argue in its brief that 
the plaintiff's business will be hurt by the Commission-
er's action allowing a competitive alternative to Barnes 
to come into the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area because 
such action would allegedly violate the antitrust laws. 
However, it would appear that the entry of a competitor 
into a market where there is presently only one bank, 
would foster the purpose behind the antitrust laws — to 
encourage competition. 
Appellant's argument is even more confusing. It 
argues in its brief to this court, although it failed to 
argue this point to the trial court, that it is not asking 
the trial court to interpret the antitrust statutes for a de-
termination of liability under them, but for a determina-
tion of whether their standards were violated. Plaintiff 
may be attempting to draw this amtificiai distinction as a 
means of evading the statement made by plaintiff's coun-
sel at oral argument on defendants' motion for summary 
judgment when be said that the state trial court had no 
jurisdiction to decide if the antitrust laws had been vio-
lated. 
The Bank Commissioner conditioned his order upon 
the approval of the federal banking agencies which were 
examining the federal antitrust issues. The federal agen-
cies with their experience and expertise have the primary 
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jurisdiction to decide if any federal antitrust violation 
would occur by respondents' acquisition of a unit bank 
in the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. Exclusive jurisdic-
tion or primary jurisdiction to examine in the first in-
stance alleged violations of the antitrust laws or federal 
banking laws is given to the federal agencies with exper-
tise in the banking area. See Whitney National Bank 
v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411 (1965)2 and the 
defendants' brief in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 6-8. 
The agencies with the expertise in determining 
whether the standard of the federal antitrust laws have 
been violated are precisely the federal agencies to whom 
the plaintiff itself submitted the antitrust issues. See 
Exhibit C accompanying defendants' brief in support of 
its Motion for a Summary Judgment — plaintiff's letter 
to the Federal Reserve Board, and Exhibit D — defen-
dants' response to plaintiff's letter to the Federal Re-
serve Board. 
2
 In cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional exper-
ience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative 
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject 
matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts 
after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve 
as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uni-
formity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to 
a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review 
by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary re-
sort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying 
legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by 
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more 
flexible procedure. (Emphasis added.) Whitney National Bank 
v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 421 (1965). 
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Appellant attempted in its brief to argue the merits 
of its dubious antitrust allegations. The defendants' let-
ter to the Federal Reserve Board illustrates the inap-
propriateness of the cases cited on pages 18 and 19 of 
appellant's brief. (See Exhibit D accompanying defen-
dants' brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment.) 
In addition, the plaintiff in its amended complaint, 
paragraph 10 (a), made only a naked allegation that the 
Commissioner's action would violate the antitrust laws. 
The plaintiff in no way buttressed those allegations with 
any specific reference to the facts in this case. These 
allegations are a shallow attempt by the plaintiff-appel-
lant to delay the implementation of the state adminis-
trative agency's decision in this matter. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem on July 9, 1975, issued their opinion on the applica-
tion of First Security Corporation to acquire First Se-
curity Bank of Kaysville, Kaysville, Utah.. The Board's 
Order is attached as Exhibit A. This federal agency re-
viewed the comments submitted by Barnes Banking Com-
pany of Kaysville. After reviewing all the comments and 
implications under the banking and antitrust laws, the 
Federal Reserve Board concluded: 
The establishment of Bank by Applicant First 
Security should foster competition by introduc-
ing a banking alternative to Protestant [Barnes], 
the only bank in Kaysville. Moreover, as a sub-
sidiary of Applicant, Bank will be able to offer 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a broad range of banking services to the resi-
dents of the area. In the Board's judgment, the 
benefits likely to be derived from Applicant's 
proposal in terms of increased competition and 
greater convenience and banking services are 
such that approval of the application would be 
appropriate. Accordingly, it is the Board's judg-
ment that the proposed transaction would be in 
the public interest and that the application should 
be approved. Federal Reserve System Board of 
Governor's Order approving Acquisition of Bank, 
July 9, 1975, at page 4. 
In this case, the state agency has the primary juris-
diction to examine the state issues and the federal bank-
ing agencies have the primary jurisdiction to examine the 
federal antitrust and banking issues and to apply the 
standards enunciated in the federal statutes. See Whit-
ney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, supra. 
The appropriate federal agencies, the F.D.I.C. (the 
F.D.I.C. Order is attached as Exhibit B) and the Federal 
Reserve Board, after their own independent investigation 
and analysis and after careful examination of the Pro-
testant Barnes' [Appellant's] contentions have concluded 
that the acquisition of a unit bank by the defendants in 
Kaysville will not violate any federal banking or antitrust 
laws, 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has ignored the central issue before this 
court: Is there substantial evidence in the record to 
support the state agency's decision? Plaintiff-appellant 
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attempts to put this court in 'the posture of redeciding 
factual issues that were properly decided by the Com-
missioner of Financial Institutions. There is subsitanitial 
evidence in the record to support the administrative de-
cision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
L. Ridd Larson and 
Jonathan A. Dibble 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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EXHIBIT A 
FEDEI IAL RESERVE S Y STEM; 
FIRST SEC! JRITY CORPORATION 
Order Approving Acquisition of Bank 
First Security Corporation, Salt Lake City; Utah, 
a bank holding company within the meaning of the Bank 
;
 ling Company Act, has applied for the Board's ap-
proval under § 3(a) (3) of the Act (12U.S.C. 1842(a) (3)) 
to acquire all oi the voting shares of First Security t^nt< 
Bank of Kaysville, Kaysville, Utah. 
Notice of the application, affording opportunity for 
Interested persons to submit comments and views, has 
been given in accordance with § 3(b) of the Act. The 
time for filing comments and views has expired, and the 
Board has considered the application and -all comments 
received, including those submitted on behalf of Barnes 
Banking Company of Kaysville ("Protestant''?, in light 
of the factors set forth in & V<^ of the Act .' r ^ C 
1 842 (c\), 
>licant, the largest banking organization in Utah, 
controls six Utah banks with aggregate deposits of $844.1 
million, representing approximately 28.5 per cent of all 
commercial bank deposits in the state.1 In addition, Ap-
plicant controls one bank in Idaho and one bank in Wy-
1
 Banking data are as of December .il. I'.)<'] unless otherwise nidi 
cated, and reflect holding compam iummtions and -irqui^itions 
approved through May 31, 1975. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ii 
oming, each of which was acquired by Applicant prior 
to the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956. Since Bank is a proposed new bank, its acquisition 
by Applicant would not immediately increase Applicant's 
share of commercial bank deposits in Utah. 
Bank is to be located in Kaysville, a smaU "bedroom" 
community situated almost midway between Ogden and 
Salt Lake City. Kaysville, which is presently served by 
only one other bank, the "Protestant/' is located on the 
southern boundary of the Ogden metropolitan area,2 a 
market served by ten banks. Applicant's lead bank is the 
largest bank in this market, with a 30.9 per cent share 
of total deposits (as of June 30, 1973). Since Bank is a 
new bank, consummation of the proposal would not elim-
inate any existing competition. Nor does it appear that 
the transaction would have adverse effects on the devel-
opment of competition in the future. Accordingly, com-
petitive considerations are regarded by the Board as be-
ing consistent with approval of the application. 
The financial and managerial resources and future 
prospects of Applicant and its subsidiaries are regarded 
as satisfactory. Bank, as a proposed new bank, has no 
financial or operating history; however, its future pros-
pects as a subsidiary of Applicant appear favorable. Bank 
would provide a source of additional full banking services 
to the residents of the Kaysville area. Accordingly, con-
siderations relating to the convenience and needs of the 
2
 Defined as the Rand-McNally R.M.A. of Ogden, Utah. 
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community to be served lend some weight toward ap-
proval of the application. 
In its consideration of the subject application, the 
Board has considered the comments submitted on behalf 
of Protestant, a bank located one block from the pro-
posed site of Bank. Protestant, a unit bank with deposits 
of approximately $17 million, contends that Applicant's 
acquisition of Bank would lessen competition, restrain 
trade, and tend toward monopoly, without producing any 
countervailing advantage to the convenience and needs 
of the citizens of Kaysville. These contentions were pre-
sented before the CoinmissioiK-i at Financial Institutions 
of the State of Utah at :-\ public hearing during the pen-
dency of the charter application of Bank,3 In an Order 
dated August 22, 1973, the Commissioner approved the 
establishment of Bank, pending approval by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation of insurance for Bank's 
accounts and approval by the Board of the application 
herein. Protestant appealed the Commissioner's Order 
to the District Court in and for the Salt Lake County, 
Utah, which granted a Motion for Sumrnaiy indprr^nt 
in favor of Applicant and Bank on December LI, ly?4. 
Subsequently, Protestant appealed the District Court 
action to the Supreme Court of Utah, which has not yet 
rendered its decision on the appeal, 
3
 Protestant have submitted to the Board copies of the Commission-
er's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and Order, and the Board 
has made those materials part; of thr nro'-l --»n which it relied in 
this matter. 
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In the Board's opinion, the objection of Protestant 
does not warrant denial of the subject application. The 
home-office protection laws of Utah prevent any of Ap-
plicant's existing banks from establishing branches in 
KaysviUe. Accordingly, aside from the acquisition of 
Protestant, the subject proposal represents Applicant's 
sole means of competing directly in the KaysviUe com-
munity. The establishment of Bank by AppMcant should 
foster competition by introducing a banking alternative 
to Protestant, the only bank in KaysviUe. Moreover, as 
a subsidiary of Applicant, Bank wUl be able to offer a 
broad range of banking services to the residents of the 
area. In the Board's judgment, the benefits likely to be 
derived from Applicant's proposal in teams of increased 
competition and greater convenience and banking ser-
vices are such that approval of the application would be 
appropriate. Accordingly, it is the Board's judgment that 
the proposed transaction would be in the public interest 
and that the application should be approved. 
On the basis of the record, the application is ap-
proved for the reasons summarized above. The transac-
tion shall not be made (a) before the thirtieth calendar 
day following the effective date of this Order, nor (b) 
later than three months after that date, and (c) First 
Security State Bank of KaysviUe, KaysviUe, Utah shall 
be opened for business not later than six months after 
the effective date of this Order. Each of the periods de-
scribed in (b) and (c) may be extended for good cause 
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by the Board, or by the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco pursuant to delegated authority. 
By order of the Board -of Governors,4 effective July 
9, 1975. 
(Signed) Ilieodore E. Ai lison 
Theodore E. Allison 
Secretary of the Boa rd 
[SEAL] 
E X H I B I T B 
FEDERAL DEPOSH ; \ - ' " • * / < ; ' '"\* * .'/.V 
IN RE: First Security State Bank of Kaysville 
(Proposed) 
Kaysville, Davis County, Utah 
Application for Federal Drpnsit hi-iij. = -.r, 
ORDER 
The Board of Directors has fully considered all facts and 
information relevant to the Factors of Section 6 of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and relating to the appli-
cation for Federal deposit insurance for the proposed First 
Security State Bank n; K.ivsville, Kav.*:vilk\ I Jfcah, in-
4
 \ - . ) i i ' ^ irn Uii.- aitiwii. \ !«'(* '•' 1hairm;itt Vl'tthcil and < ;--.wmo:>. 
Bucher, Holland, Wallkh .md <"nldu--i! Ali^-Ht
 t*m\ not voting; 
Chairman Burns. 
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eluding facts and information made available to the Board 
of Directors by the proponents, the Corporation's Divi-
sion of Bank Supervision and other information acquired 
by the Corporation. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the ap-
plication submitted on behalf of the proposed First Se-
curity State Bank of Kaysville, to be located at 250 North 
Main Street, Kaysville, Davis County, Utah, be and the 
same hereby is approved subject to the following condi-
tions: 
1. That beginning paid-in capital funds of at 
least $500,000 be provided of Which no less 
than $200,000 shall be allocated to common 
capital and no less than $200,000 to surplus; 
2. That Fitfst Security Corporation (a reg-
istered bank holding company) obtain prior 
approval from the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System to acquire vot-
ing control of the stock of the proposed 
bank; 
3. That any changes in proposed management 
or proposed ownership (5% or more of 
stock) will render this commitment null and 
void unless such proposal is approved by the 
Director, Division of Bajnk Supervision, prior 
to opening of the bank; 
4. That Federal deposit insurance will not be-
come effective unless and until the appli-
cant has been established as a State bank 
(not a member of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem), that it has authority to conduct a 
banking business and that its establishment 
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and operation as a bank has been fully ap-
proved by the State Banking Department; 
5, That until the conditional commitment here-
in ORDERED becomes effective, the Cor-
poration shall have the right to alter, sus-
pend, or withdraw the said commitment 
should any interim development be deemed 
by the Board of Directors to warrant such 
action; and 
™ i if deposit insurance has not become 
effective by August 22, 1975 (expiration 
date of State authorization), or unless, in 
the meantime, a request for an extension of 
time has been approved by the Corporation, 
consent granted will expire on August 22, 
1975. 
Dnivd ru Washington!, II, C this 6th day of March, 
l!)7f>. 
in \' ontmn oi- i : i <>n\un =.•* DIRECTORS 
ALAN R. Mll.LKlx 
Executive Secreuuy 
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